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The 2003 avian inﬂuenza (H7N7) outbreak in the Netherlands
involved large commercial ﬂocks and some backyard ﬂocks (Stege-
man et al., 2004; Thomas et al., 2005; Le Menach et al., 2006; Boender
et al., 2007; Bavinck et al., 2009). However, Thomas et al. (2005)
argued that the contact structure and the small size of the backyard
ﬂocksmeant that their role in this epidemic was “probably negligible”.
This conclusion was buttressed by a later analysis of the next
generation matrix for a two-type SEI model of a portion of the
outbreak, which led Bavinck et al. (2009) to conclude that “from an
epidemiological perspective” backyard ﬂocks played only a marginal
role. On face value, this has obvious implications for control of avian
inﬂuenza in Europe and North America and, indeed, for the
architecture and data requirements of future models of this disease.
For example, Bavinck et al. (2009) suggest that “if, in a future
epidemic, backyard ﬂocks appear to be less susceptible than
commercial ﬂocks, as shown in our study, preemptive culling might
not be necessarily applied to backyard poultry ﬂocks, as the
probability of becoming infected appears to be much lower.” While
not necessarily disagreeing with Bavinck et al. (2009), it will be
argued here that it would be unwise to further conclude that we can
ignore the contribution of backyard ﬂocks to future epidemics even if
they can be shown to be less susceptible than commercial ﬂocks. This
is especially true when we are attempting to estimate the effort
required to curtail an epidemic using strategies directed at only onetype (sensu Roberts and Heesterbeek, 2003; Diekmann et al., 2010) of
host.
This paper will be set out as follows. First, we shall consider the
rather difﬁcult problem of deﬁning what we mean by “backyard
ﬂocks” in the context of commercial poultry operations in Western
Europe and North America. Next we shall summarize the evidence for
and against the notion that backyard ﬂocks contribute rather little to
the overall transmission of avian inﬂuenza virus in commercial
operations. Finally, we shall compare the analysis of Bavinck et al.
(2009) with our own analysis of the 2004 highly pathogenic avian
inﬂuenza (H7N3) outbreak that occurred in the Fraser Valley of British
Columbia, Canada (Anon, 2004), and, speciﬁcally, address the
question of how we can use such analyses to estimate the effort
required for targeted interventions (that is, strategies directed against
commercial ﬂocks only).
Backyard ﬂock — deﬁnitions
One of the difﬁculties we have in dealing with backyard ﬂocks is
the difﬁculty of deﬁning what we mean by a “backyard ﬂock”. The
phrase is in common use but as the OIE (World Health Organization
for Animals) points outs there is no accepted deﬁnition (Anon, 2009).
Common criteria include the number of birds in the ﬂock frequently
conﬂated with whether or not the ﬂock is included in some register of
commercial ﬂocks: for example, the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture,
Nature and Food Quality deﬁnes a backyard ﬂock as consisting of
fewer than 500 birds or as not having a unique farm number (Bavinck
et al., 2009); the National Animal Health Monitoring System “Poultry
'04” study in the USA deﬁned backyard ﬂocks as residenceswith fewer
than 1000 birds other than pet birds (Garber et al., 2007); the
Canadian Food Inspection Agency deﬁnes backyard ﬂocks as ﬂocks
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poultry operations (Anon, 2004). Sometimes, by default, backyard
ﬂocks are simply those ﬂocks which by reason of their small size are
not obligated to be recorded in national databases: models of avian
inﬂuenza in Britain do not included ﬂocks less than 50 birds because
these ﬂocks are nor reported in The Great Britain Poultry Register
(Truscott et al., 2007; Sharkey et al., 2008; Dent et al., 2008). Capua
et al. (2002) suggest that backyard ﬂocks should be deﬁned as those
having no functional connections with industrial establishments. If
we understand the word functional to indicate any contact or process
that could plausibly lead to transmission between commercial and
backyard ﬂocks (as Capua et al. clearly intend), then obviously, by
deﬁnition, ﬂocks with no functional connection to industrial premises
have no role in the epidemiology of transmission. But setting aside the
tautology implicit in the deﬁnition how would we know that there
was no functional connection? A recent study in the USA, found that
only 3.5% of all backyard ﬂocks (range 0.9–8.5%) had someone in the
household who worked for a commercial poultry operation, only 2.5%
of backyard ﬂocks received veterinary care and only 2.8% of backyard
ﬂocks were vaccinated (Anon, 2005). But even for those ﬂocks in
which there were no obvious commercial or social contacts (e.g.
shared personnel, equipment or breeding birds) we could never be
sure that wind-blown virus (for example) did not constitute a
functional connection between industrial and backyard premises. In
the 2004 highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza (H7N3) outbreak that
occurred in the Fraser Valley of British Columbia, Canada, not only was
there epidemiological evidence of wind borne spread of the virus, but
also air sampling techniques detected small quantities of wind borne
virus up to 800 m from infected premises (Power, 2005; Schoﬁeld
et al., 2005). Maps of the affected area show that commercial and
backyard ﬂocks were intimately intermingled and although the
average distance between commercial ﬂocks was about 2–3 km, the
distance between commercial ﬂocks and backyard ﬂocks was
frequently 1 km or less (Hudson and Elwell, 2004). The air sampling
studies did not demonstrate whether the viruses found some distance
from the infected premises were infectious (Power, 2005) and so our
argument is circumstantial — but most of the arguments about
backyard ﬂocks are circumstantial.
Risk factors for infection
Several case–control and other studies in Western Europe and
North America have identiﬁed risk factors for poultry ﬂocks being
infected with avian inﬂuenza virus. In the 2004 (H7N3) outbreak in
British Columbia the odds of commercial ﬂocks (N1000 birds) being
infected were 5.6 times greater that the odds of backyard ﬂocks being
infected, and infected backyard ﬂocks were always discovered after
nearby commercial ﬂocks had been infected (Lees, 2004). In the large,
low pathogenicity (H7N2) outbreak in Virginia, USA in 2002 not a
single backyard ﬂockwas reported to be infected (Akey, 2003) despite
the usual intermingling of commercial and backyard ﬂocks. With
respect to the risk that commercial ﬂocks will be infected, at least two
studies found that proximity to backyard ﬂocks was not a risk factor
(McQuiston et al., 2005; Thomas et al., 2005). Flock size (number of
houses or number of birds) was identiﬁed by Thomas et al. (2005) as a
risk factor in the 2003 (H7N7) outbreak in the Netherlands. Flock type
is often cited as an additional risk factor and, although the speciﬁc
type referred to in each study is different, it seems that the birds in the
longer production cycles are at more risk (McQuiston et al., 2005;
Thomas et al., 2005; Mannelli et al., 2006). Proximity to another
infected commercial farm was shown to be important in the 1999
(H7N1) outbreak in northern Italy (Mannelli et al., 2006) and in the
2003 (H7N7) outbreak in the Netherlands (Boender et al., 2007).
McQuiston et al. (2005) did not include proximity to other infected
commercial premises in their case–control study, perhaps because
Akey (2003) had already stated that the spread of the “H7N2 LPAIoutbreak in [Virginia] was most consistent with transmission
primarily by [the movement of] fomites, people, and equipment
contaminated with virus rather than by airborne transmission.” This
kind of movement between farms is by far the most entrenched
explanation for the between-farm transmission of avian inﬂuenza
virus despite the fact that rapid imposition of movement bans means
that the opportunity for the formal evaluation of the hypothesis is
very limited indeed. McQuiston et al. (2005) found that the use of
rendering to dispose of euthanized birds was a risk factor for infection
and suggested that the use of a common vehicle to transport the dead
birds to the rendering site was an important early means of
potentiating transmission, but most other arguments are based
upon, ﬁrst, the observation that long distance transmission occurs
and, second, the conviction that long distance transmission is more
easily explained by the movement of people and vehicles than by the
mechanisms usually invoked to explain local or contiguous spread
(Akey, 2003; McQuiston et al., 2005; Mannelli et al., 2006; Boender
et al., 2007). The several models of avian inﬂuenza that examine the
impact of various kinds of control strategies on transmission
attributable to the movement of people, vehicles and other fomites
between farms are based on the supposition that this kind of
transmission is important and depends upon expert opinion or
analogy with other animal diseases transmitted by the fecal oral route
(but not subject to automatic movement bans) for their estimates of
the probability of transmission given contact (Truscott et al., 2007;
Dent et al., 2008; Sharkey et al.;, 2008, Dorea et al., 2010). The
important point though, is that none of these studies included
backyard ﬂocks in their analyses of the network of premises, feed
mills, rendering plants and markets. Like Capua et al. (2002),
implicitly or explicitly, they assume that backyard ﬂocks have no
functional connection with the industrial network and are therefore
irrelevant. Nevertheless, some backyard ﬂocks do become infected
during some avian inﬂuenza outbreaks (Anon, 2005; Bavinck et al.,
2009) and policy makers continue to insist that pre-emptive culling of
backyard ﬂocks is an appropriate component of an infectious avian
disease control strategy despite recommendations to the contrary
(Capua et al., 2002; Bavinck et al., 2009). If we were to shift to control
strategies for avian inﬂuenza in which infected backyard ﬂocks and
their dangerous contacts were depopulated but all the rest of the
control effort (depopulation or vaccination) were focused on the
commercial ﬂocks would models that omitted backyard ﬂocks
altogether fairly represent the control effort required to curtail the
outbreak? How big must be the contribution of backyard ﬂocks to
transmission before we feel obligated to include them in our models?
This question is addressed in the next section.
Epidemic model of the 2004 Abbotsford (H7N3) avian inﬂuenza
outbreak
The ﬁrst recorded outbreak of highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza in
Canada occurred near Abbotsford in the Fraser Valley, British
Columbia. During the course of 91 days, 42 out of 410 commercial
ﬂocks and 11 out of 553 backyard ﬂocks were infected (Pasik et al.,
2009). Control measures included movement bans, active surveil-
lance, and an increasingly draconian program of depopulation
beginningwith the depopulation of known infected farms progressing
to the pre-emptive culling of all farms within 3, 5 or 10 km of the
infected farms (depending on the date) and culminating in a strategy
(beginning about 20–22 days into the outbreak) intended to
depopulate all the ﬂocks (whether infected or not) within the affected
area (Anon, 2004).
Most infected ﬂocks were detected as the result of active
surveillance; some were detected as the result of responses to reports
of sick birds or increased rates of mortality in ﬂocks. The epidemic
data comprise the date that the samples were taken (for PCR), the
date of positive diagnosis and the date of depopulation (Anon, 2004).
Fig. 1. The 2004 highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza (H7N3) outbreak in the Fraser
Valley of British Columbia, Canada. a. Number of days (y) between the date of sampling
and the date on which the ﬂock was depopulated plotted by sampling day (x); b. Best
ﬁt model (solid lines), cumulative number of new cases in commercial ﬂocks (solid
circles), and cumulative number of new cases in backyard ﬂocks (open circles);
c. Changes in the reproduction number during the course of the epidemic.
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inﬂuenza virus between the distinct sets of premises housing the
birds. Each set of premises often contains several ﬂocks but, for ease of
expression, we shall use the word “ﬂock” to represent the premises as
a whole and, in doing so, we shall follow the usual convention of
referring to the ﬂocks as being in “susceptible”, “latent” or “infectious”
states (although, of course, it is the condition of the birds that confer
these properties on the ﬂocks). We assumed that an infected ﬂock
passed through a latent (infected but not yet infectious) period that
lasted 2 days and was thereafter infectious until depopulation
(Boender et al., 2007). We followed the conventional assumption
that takes no account of temporal changes in the threat presented by
any given infectious ﬂock that might plausibly be attributed to the
changing number of infected birds in the ﬂock or the imposition of a
quarantine following the conﬁrmation of infection (Stegeman et al.,
2004; Le Menach et al., 2006; Bavinck et al., 2009). We divided the
host population into two host types (sensu Roberts and Heesterbeek,
2003; Diekmann et al., 2010). The two host types are commercial and
backyard ﬂocks denoted by the subscripts 1 and 2 respectively. We
further subdivided each type into susceptible (Si) ﬂocks, latently
infected ﬂocks (Ei) and infectious ﬂocks (Ii).
dS1
dt
= −β11I1S1−β12I2S1−μ1S
dE1
dt
= β11I1S1 + β12I2S1−δE1−μ1E
dI1
dt
= δE1−αI1
dS2
dt
= −β21I1S2−β22I2S2−μ2S2
dE1
dt
= β21I1S2 + β22I2S2−δE2−μ2E2
dI1
dt
= δE2−αI2:
Here β11, β12, β21 and β22 are the transmission parameters whose
values were to be estimated from the epidemic data.We assumed that
until day 21, the turnover rates (μ1 and μ2) of the susceptible
commercial and backyard ﬂocks were best represented by those rates
normally commensurate with the sector to which they belonged. We
assumed that the 410 depopulated commercial ﬂocks consisted of 96
that produced commercial table eggs, 61 that produced broiler
hatching eggs and 47 that produced turkey meat. The data in Anon
(2004) are consistent and unequivocal with respect to the numbers of
ﬂocks in each of these sectors. However, the document contains
conﬂicting reports of how many “chicken meat” ﬂocks there were in
the Fraser Valley (Anon, 2004). The quoted ﬁgures ranged between
235 and 286. Given that not all ﬂocks in the Valley were depopulated
we simply assumed that the 206 ﬂocks of the 410 ﬂocks not yet
assigned to a sector were “chicken meat” ﬂocks. Average production
cycle time for all of these sectors combinedwas estimated as (63⁎96/
410 ) + (43 ⁎ 61 / 410 ) + (14 ⁎ 47 / 410) + (7 ⁎ 206 / 410) =
26.39 weeks. Converting this average cycle time to days (185 days),
and following standard reasoning, we estimated μ1=1/185=0.0054/
ﬂock/day. Backyard ﬂocks do not undergo regular cycles of depopu-
lation and replacement (Anon, 2005) and so we conservatively
estimated the turnover rate of backyard ﬂocks as μ2=0.001/ﬂock/day.
We rather crudely mimicked the increasing pace of pre-emptive
culling of susceptible ﬂocks by replacing μ1 and μ2 with a constant
value ρ/ﬂock/day from day 21 of the outbreak. Day 21 was chosen to
most closely mimic the date on which the increased pre-emptive
culling began (Anon, 2004); we estimated the value of ρ from the
epidemic data. The rate at which latently infected ﬂocks became
infectious was given by δ=0.5/ﬂock/day. Two connected, problem-
atic issues remained. First, the epidemic data indicate only the day onwhich the ﬂock was sampled. Sometimes, sampling was carried out
because the ﬂock was experiencing a greater than expected mortality.
In the face of an epidemic it is likely that producers will be rather
sensitive to any increases in mortality and so it seems reasonable to
assume that these ﬂocks moved out of the latent phase 6–7 days
previously (Bos et al., 2007). However, most infected ﬂocks were
detected as the result of active surveillance suggesting that the move
from latency to infectiousness had occurred at some unknown time
less than 6–7 days before the sampling date. We therefore con-
structed a new data set from the epidemic data in which the move
from latency to infectiousness for all detected ﬂocks was set by
subtracting a random number between 1 and 7 from the sampling
date. Given our assumptions, the date of infection was 2 days prior to
that. The second problematic issue was that the depopulation rate of
infected ﬂocks (α) increased during the course of the outbreak. Fig. 1a
shows the time (y) between sampling and depopulation plotted by
the day of sampling (x). A simple least squares ﬁt demonstrated that
y=9.56−0.17x. If we assume that an average of 3.5 days had elapsed
between the move from latency to infectiousness we estimate that
α≈1/(13.00−0.17x)/ﬂock/day. The maximum likelihood algo-
rithms available in Berkeley Madonna (version 8.3.9) were used to
ﬁt themodel to the data. Twomodels were ﬁtted to the data. In the full
model it was assumed initially that transmission was possible within
and between host types (i.e. β11, β12, β21 and β22 were all greater than
zero). In the reduced model, it was assumed that infected backyard
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played no part in transmission (i.e. β12=β22=0). The best ﬁt as
judged by the root mean square deviationwas obtained using a model
in which β11=0.000505, β12=0.00238, β21=0.000166 and β22=0
(Fig. 1b).
The basic reproduction number and the effort required to render
R0b1
The next generation matrix (K) for the Abbotsford outbreak model
is
K =
δ
δ + μ1ð Þ
β11N1
α0
δ
δ + μ1ð Þ
β12N2
α0
δ
δ + μ2ð Þ
β21N1
α0
δ
δ + μ2ð Þ
β22N2
α0
2
6664
3
7775:
Here, N1, N2 and α0 are respectively the number of susceptible
commercial and backyard ﬂocks at the start and the initial value of the
infectious period. Flocks that were depopulated either because they
were infected or as part of the pre-emptive culling processes were not
repopulated until the epidemic was over. Furthermore, the rate of
preemptive culling increased over time. Thus, as the epidemic
progressed, the number of susceptible ﬂocks decreased. In addition,
the infectious period (1/α) decreased. As a result, the reproduction
number (calculated as the dominant eigenvalue of the matrix, K,
Diekmann et al., 2010) also decreased over time (Fig. 1c). The basic
reproduction number (calculated using the initial values for all
parameters) was given by R0=4.8, which is higher than a previous
estimate (Garske et al., 2006) and generally higher than most
estimates for the basic reproduction number of avian inﬂuenza
(Garske et al., 2006; Bavinck et al., 2009). This arises because
infectious period is usually assumed to be about 7 days (thus α=1/
7=0.142/ﬂock/day even at the start). However, like Stegeman et al.
(2004), we found that, initially, the infectious period was about
13 days and decreased once the outbreak had been recognized and
surveillance and detection became more efﬁcient.
We now consider the question of targeted control. Bavinck et al.
(2009) suggested that if backyard ﬂocks appear to be less susceptible
than commercial ﬂocks it might be sufﬁcient to pre-emptively cull
only the commercial ﬂocks. We shall consider this proposition ﬁrst for
the 2004 H7N3 Abbotsford outbreak and then for the 2003 H7N7
outbreak in the Netherlands. Like Bavinck et al. (2009) we
acknowledge and then ignore the fact that the infectious period
decreased during the course of the outbreak; for the purposes of the
arguments that follow, we shall set the value ofα to its overall average
value (0.143/ﬂock/day). The length of the infectious period reﬂects
the efﬁciency detection and depopulation. We shall imagine a
situation in which all infected ﬂocks (commercial and backyard
ﬂocks) can be detected and depopulated (without repopulation) with
equal efﬁciency. This is the default response but it is often not
sufﬁcient to curtail the outbreak as rapidly as policy makers would
like and pre-emptive depopulation strategies are frequently imple-
mented in addition. In what follows we shall investigate what fraction
of the ﬂocksmust be depopulated in order to curtail the epidemic. The
next generation matrix for the Abbotsford outbreak with the initial
ﬂock numbers is thus
K = k11 k12k21 k22
 
= 1:46 0:870:48 0:0
 
:
The basic reproduction number R0=1.70.
In a single host type model, the proportion (p) of susceptible
ﬂocks that must be pre-emptively depopulated to ensure thatinfectious ﬂocks give rise to less than one new infected ﬂock each
would be
p = 1− 1
1:70
 
= 0:41:
If pre-emptive culling were applied equally to commercial and
backyard ﬂocks alike such that the numbers both host types were
reduced to 59% of their starting values, the next generation matrix
would be
K = 0:86 0:510:28 0:0
 
and the reproduction number in the presence of control measures
would be R=1.0, which is the required and expected result. However,
the intention is to pre-emptively depopulate only the commercial
ﬂocks. If we reduce only the numbers of commercial ﬂocks to 59% of
their starting values, the next generation matrix becomes
K = 0:86 0:870:48 0:0
 
and the reproduction number is R=1.2, which is not sufﬁcient to
eliminate transmission. Even when the backyard ﬂocks do not
constitute a reservoir host population (and in this case they clearly
do not because k22=0), they can contribute to overall virus
transmission provided k12N0 and k21N0. An infectious commercial
ﬂock can infect other commercial ﬂocks either directly, or indirectly
via spillover to backyard ﬂocks. Roberts and Heesterbeek (2003) and
Heesterbeek and Roberts (2007) have pointed out, when there ismore
than one host type, and targeted control involves only one of them, the
overall reproduction numberwill always lead to underestimates of the
effort required to curtail the epidemic. Roberts and Heesterbeek
(2003), Hill and Longini (2003), and Heesterbeek and Roberts (2007)
have each described methods for calculating the relevant statistic (Tc,
Heesterbeek and Roberts, 2007). For a two host type model,
Tc = k11 +
k12·k21
1−k22ð Þ
:
When k11=1.46, k12=0.87, k21=0.48 and k22=0, then Tc=1.88.
Using this value to estimate the proportion (p) of susceptible
commercial ﬂocks that must be depopulated to ensure that infectious
ﬂocks give rise to less than one new infected ﬂock gives
p = 1− 1
1:88
 
= 0:47:
Recall that the value of p calculated using R was 0.41. The increase
in p that resulted from using Tc rather than R does not seem very big
but given the number of susceptible commercial ﬂocks near
Abbotsford at the start of the outbreak (410) this represents an
additional 25 ﬂocks that must be pre-emptively depopulated in order
to curtail the epidemic. This is not trivial. If selective vaccination of
commercial ﬂocks were the chosen strategy rather than pre-emptive
culling, the same calculations apply. Using the total number of
commercial birds killed during the Abbotsford outbreak to estimate
the overall average number of birds per ﬂock (Hudson and Elwell,
2004) suggests that a value for p of 0.47 rather than 0.41 represents an
additional million doses of vaccine.
We can apply the same arguments to the H7N7 avian inﬂuenza
outbreak studied by Bavinck et al. (2009). The next generation matrix
for the two host type model in that case was
K = 1:33 0:0670:44 0:23
 
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R0=1.33. If we were mistakenly to use this number to calculate p, we
would get a value of p=0.27. The value of Tc for this model is
Tc = 1:33 +
0:067:0:44
1−0:23ð Þ = 1:37
and
p = 1− 1
1:37
 
= 0:27
Given the number of commercial farms (984) in the outbreak
studied by Bavinck et al. (2009) this represents an additional 10
commercial farms.
Discussion
One of the more important contributions models can make to
the decision making process is to provide estimates of the effort
required to achieve speciﬁc results. One methodology for reducing
control effort is to focus on only one host type. In the context of the
commercial poultry industry, especially in countries for which there
is little information about the location of backyard ﬂocks — and
access is difﬁcult, depopulating or vaccinating only the commercial
ﬂocks is an appealing prospect. This idea is buttressed by expert
opinion (Capua et al., 2002; Akey, 2003) and modeling studies
(Bavinck et al., 2009, and the work presented here) both of which
suggest that the contribution of backyard ﬂocks to the on-going
transmission dynamics of an epidemic is modest at best. However, as
we have shown, even this modest contribution may be sufﬁcient to
compromise the calculated effort required for the targeted control
strategies. How much this will matter to decision makers will
depend upon how risk averse they are, but they should at least be
made aware that effort estimates that do not take account of
backyard ﬂocks will probably be underestimated.
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